Inside Sean Payton’s fourth-down Patriots-Broncos call

Last Sunday night, Sean Payton was sitting in his office denver broncos feature, watching film of your opponent in the upcoming AFC Championship Game: The new England Patriots. he wanted to get Los Angeles Rams–Chicago Bears A divisional round game is playing in the background. He turned on a flatscreen in his office. He wandered around, somehow ended up on Nickelodeon and “Dora the Explorer.” He finally found the right moment to make a crucial decision for the Bears on their first drive. On fourth-and-2 from the Rams 21, they decided to forego the gimme field goal and go for it — exactly the type of call that has dominated playoff professional and college football this season, and could end up winning a tight game or being one of the main reasons for a loss.

Peyton watched the Bears attack, and he narrowed his eyes. “Kick it,” he said.

on drama, Caleb Williams was stopped, giving Chicago a three-point loss – the difference in the final score.

“Why isn’t the coach kicking field goals?” Peyton said, turning to game preparation.

This decision for coaches – when to go for it on fourth-and-short and when to kick – has become one of the most scrutinized and divisive calls in football, an easy game discussion debate. For most of professional football’s existence, it wasn’t even a decision. The coaches took away the points. This began to change in 2002, when a famous Cal-Berkeley economist named David Romer wrote “It’s the Fourth Down and What Does the Bellman Equation Say?” Wrote a paper titled.

Using Bellman equation– Ei Di(gt) Vi = Pgt + Bgt Ei Di(gt+1) Vi – eg – Roemer’s conclusion was clear: The odds of what could happen after a successful conversion on fourth-and-four or less are greater than those of kicking a field goal or, in some cases, punting and the field of play. Simply put, the math told coaches to be more aggressive.

Roemer’s findings did not become conventional wisdom for more than a decade. Now, broadcasts feature in-game analytics with percentages. Coaches like Detroit’s Dan Campbell embrace it as an inevitability – as part of their identity.

Broncos’ director of game management/assistant offensive line coach Evan Rothstein is one of Payton’s most trusted and valued employees. He came to Denver from Detroit and New England, where he learned from Bill Belichick, who revolutionized situational football strategy. On Saturday mornings during football season, Rothstein gives mesmerizing presentations to Payton and the coordinators, recounting key moments from the previous week’s games and concluding with data-backed opinions about what the Broncos should do in a similar situation.

But in the end, it’s Peyton’s call.

Normally, if the Broncos are driving and are faced with a fourth-and-short, they will strongly consider going for it. If it is fourth-and-1 after the opponent turns the ball over and gives Denver a short field, Payton will usually take the point.

Sunday’s AFC Championship game was certainly different. It was different because of the quarterback jarrett stidham The star was making his first start of the season after bo nix Last week he fractured his ankle. This was different because Denver’s defense had not performed particularly well against top opponents since the bye week. It was different because the Broncos could have easily lost buffalo bill in the divisional round because their red zone offense was ineffective: one touchdown in four trips. And it was different because a Super Bowl appearance was at stake. All those facts can be used to argue for or against it.

The Broncos led 7-0 in the second quarter against New England on Sunday. They drove into the Patriots red zone. On third-and-6, Stidham ran for 5 yards at the New England 14-yard line. That left fourth-and-1 — and a familiar decision. Denver had gained ground on every play of that drive, and up to that point, its defense had forced three punts.

“I wanted 14-0,” Peyton told me later.

It’s one thing to go for it; Finding a good play is another thing. Payton ordered 11 personnel – one running back, one tight end and three receivers – and called a running play called nickel duo. “A sub-run versus a sub-front,” he said.

Then, Payton called timeout. He wanted to think.

Duo was Denver’s top fourth-and-shortest running back; Slipper naked, a bootleg to the right, it was a top 4th and short pass. He took the pass and left. But immediately, the Patriots surprised Denver by playing Red 2, a zone defense, behind a six-man front. There was no chance for drama. Stidham was thrown into traffic, incomplete. Denver not only missed the three points but also missed its last, best opportunity for easy points. The Broncos never got that close to the end zone the rest of the game.

Payton said softly as he walked out of the stadium, “I wish I had stayed with the opening game call.” “The look he showed in the movie, and the look we saw, was not the look we got.”

Denver, the AFC’s top seed and home underdog for both playoff games, lost for several reasons. The Broncos failed to run and catch. He missed two field goals. Stidham fumbled in the second quarter, allowing New England’s only touchdown, and threw an interception at the end of the game. Denver’s defense played one of its best games of the year but forced zero turnovers. A priority throughout the week — in the coaches’ game-planning sessions and in full-team meetings — was to get the quarterback involved. drake may And stop him from running away. Mays finished with 10 carries for 65 yards and a touchdown, including a rushing touchdown to tie the game with just under two minutes remaining.

But Denver also lost because of Payton’s decision. Something about fourth downs brings out the explainable and the inexplicable, the rational and the irrational in coaches. You never know what you’ll find. Belichick still regrets finishing fourth New York Giants In Super Bowl XLII. In Sunday’s NFC Championship Game against Seattle, the Rams’ Sean McVay – a coach who is often criticized for trailing on fourth down, and who kicked field goals against Chicago last week and won – lost 31–27 on fourth downs twice midway through the fourth quarter, trailing the first time, missing the second time, and coming away with zero points in the loss. Why do some fourth downs convert and some fail?

Payton hates it when people try to rationalize a missed opportunity or failed play by shrugging and saying, “It’s football.” It’s an insult to his soul and everything he stands for when he and his staff work 18-hour days to impose their will on the toss of a coin.

But the thing is, that’s football. and always will be. After Sunday’s game, Payton entered his small office down the hall from the locker room. He sat down and started looking at the floor. He is 62 years old and has been the head coach for 19 years. He has one Super Bowl win and several devastating playoff losses. It was quiet, except for the random sounds of the season-ending crash landing: the echo of shouted expletives, the sound of coaches and staff wondering and whispering here and there.

Moments passed. Peyton sat up.

“I can’t believe we lost.”

A few more seconds passed.

“That fourth down…”