During the last two decades of the Cold War, several observers considered the West German Army, Bundesvehar as the most capable land force among European NATO allies. Highly professional and very well trained, German land force, like the entire German army, benefited from defense expenditure that until 1988 had more than 3 percent of the country’s GDP. And with an economy that was the largest in Western Europe, West German defense spending was higher than all NATO members other than America, UK and Turkey.
As a result of the end of the Cold War, there was a decline in defense expenses from a-colored Germany. The East East German population faced the need to integrate in its extremely generous welfare system, and due to no clear threat to its safety, Berlin’s expenses decreased by 2 percent in 1992 and continued to fall until 1.07 percent in 2005. The following year, at its Riga Summit, NATO formally agreed that members would be committed to spending 2 percent on the state GDP. German expenses increased that year – but only up to 1.2 percent.
The lack of German expenditure on defense revealed itself in a rapidly poor condition of German military readiness. As of 2010, the German army’s once-deprived leopard tanks suffered from low availability, as significant numbers were in storage or maintenance. Air Force tornado and eurofighters were suffering from a shortage of aircraft spare parts. German fleet with aging, with some replacement and limited deployment.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates was prone to Germany when in 2011 They told His NATO colleagues said that “If the current trend is not stopped in the decline of European defense capabilities and does not reversed, the future American political leader – for whom the Cold War did not experience it for me – maybe it could not consider the return of US investment in NATO.”
Even in 2014, Russia’s seizure and Crimeia’s anecdote, and the NATO’s 2 percent of its target re -confirming at the Wales Summit that year, was rarely an imprint on the German defense spending. Indeed, it took five more years for defense spending, which grew more than 1.25 percent. In February 2022, Russia began to change the process of German spending only after attacking Ukraine.
Five days after the Russian invasion, German Chancellor Olof Scollaz – which he was called “Zeitenweende” Or “Turning Point” speech for Bundestag announced that his government “will” install a special fund for Bundesvehar “with a one-half amount of 100 billion euros for funds. We will use this money for necessary investment and ordnance projects.” He said that “Now we will invest more than 2 percent of our gross domestic product in our protection.” Germany actually hit a 2 percent mark in the beginning of 2024 and it will reach 2.4 percent this year.
The successor of Sholz, elected in May after the Sholaz government was defeated by the government in December 2024, announced an even faster jump in the German defense spending, thanks to a constitutional improvement that would allow the government to borrow above the GDP at the previous rate of 0.35 percent of the GDP. Three weeks ago, merz Committed Germany to double its defense spending by 2029, leading to a new target of 3.5 percent of NATO’s GDP to ahead of almost all other European NATO colleagues.
Merz’s initiative is definitely welcome, but it is not clear that he will be able to follow through his promises. The German public is deeply concerned about Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine, and thus the government’s plans have not been negatively responded to. Nevertheless, even with less restrictive obstacles on the government’s borrowings, Merz can be difficult to maintain liberal social welfare regime that the Germans have benefited for decades. Any deduction or amendment of those benefits can lead to a popular backlash against planned defense growth.
In addition, the fact is that Germany is expected to continue to purchase US defense products – currently $ 15 billion – at a time when the US is extremely unpopular throughout Western Europe, can speed up that backlash.
Whether the Marg government will have the fate of facing popular pressure over the next several years, this is an open question. Hopefully it will happen, because Germany, once in Central Europe, the NATO Phulcram, will be important for the reliability of the preventive of the alliance against a Russia, whose neighbors continue tortured hunger to swallow.
Dov is a senior advisor on S. Zakheim Strategic and international study centers And for the Deputy Chairman of the Board Foreign policy research instituteHe was the Defense Department and Chief Financial Officer for the Defense Department from 2001 to 2004 and the Undercrapping of the Deputy Understanding of Defense from 1985 to 1987.
